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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tiffany Dee Razon timely appeals from the district court's orders revoking 
probation. On appeal, Ms. Razon argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due 
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various 
transcripts she requested to be created at the public's expense. Ms. Razon also argues 
that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the length 
of her sentences upon revoking probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 39627 (hereinafter, older case), Ms. Razon was charged, by 
Information, with possession of a controlled substance and forgery. (R., pp.61-62.) 
Ms. Razon pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, and the State 
dismissed the remaining charge. (R., pp.124.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.147-
152.) Upon review of Ms. Razon's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the 
district court suspended the sentence and placed her on probation. (R., pp.163-168.) 
In docket number 39628 (hereinafter, new case), Ms. Razon was charged, by 
Information, with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.393-394.) This new 
charge was also submitted to the district court as a probation violation in the older case. 
(R., p.393-393, 216-220.) In addition to the new charge, the State also alleged that 
Ms. Razon violated various terms of her probation in the older case. (R., pp. 189-197, 
216-220.) In the older case, Ms. Razon admitted to violating the terms of her probation 
for not reporting to her probation officer, by absconding supervision, by being 
1 
discharged from counseling, for failing to submit to substance testing, for changing her 
residence without permission, for failing top complete community service, failing to wear 
an ankle monitor, and for using a controlled substance. (R., pp.190-191, 230.) In the 
newer case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Razon pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance. (R., ppAOO-409, 415.) 
At a global sentencing/probation disposition hearing, the district court revoked 
probation in the older case and imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three 
years fixed in the newer case. (R., pp.224-228, 414-419.) The district court ordered 
the sentences to run concurrently, and it retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.224-228, 414-
419.) Upon review of Ms. Razon's rider, the district court suspended the sentences and 
placed her on probation. (R., pp.233-238, 430-435.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed two separate reports of probation 
violation and two separate motions to revoke probation in each case, wherein the State 
alleged that Ms. Razon violated various terms of her probation. (R., pp.244-250, 287-
291, 452-458, 492-496.) At a consolidated hearing, Ms. Razon admitted to violating the 
terms of her probation for using methamphetamine on two occasions and for being 
discharged from substance addiction treatment. 1 (R., pp. 244-250, 287-291, 319, 452-
458, 492-496, 524.) The district court then revoked probation in both cases. 
(R., pp.330-333, 536-539.) Ms. Razon timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp.336-338, 
542-544.) 
1 The State filed separate criminal charges based on the same actions which lead to the 
probation violations in the newer and older cases. It appears that Ms. Razon previously 
pleaded guilty to those charges and was sentenced in that case at this hearing. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-19.) However, Ms. Razon did not appeal from the judgment 
of conviction in that matter. (12/19/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-19.) 
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On appeal, Ms. Razon's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record 
with transcripts of the entry of plea hearing, held on July 24, 2006 (Docket number 
39627), the sentencing hearing, held on September 18, 2006 (Docket number 39627), 
the rider review hearing, held on March 7,2007 (Docket number 39627), the evidentiary 
hearing, held on April 21, 2009 (Docket number 39627), the rider review hearing, held 
on October 14, 2009 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628), the admit/deny probation 
violation hearing held on July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628), and the 
entry of plea hearing held on April 20, 2009 (Docket number 39628), and to suspend the 
briefing schedule pending preparation of the requested transcripts. (Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, 
Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) The State objected to Ms. Razon's request for the 
transcripts of all the hearings except the admit/deny probation violation hearing held on 
July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628). (Objection in Part to "Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" 
(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme 
Court entered an order granting Ms. Razon's request for a transcript of the admit/deny 
probation violation hearing held on July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628), 
but denied her request for the other transcripts. (Order, (hereinafter, Order Denying 
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Razon due process and equal protection 
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the 
length of Ms. Razon's sentences upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Razon Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Ms. Razon filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various transcripts. 
With the exception of one transcript, all of those requests were denied by the Supreme 
Court. On appeal, Ms. Razon is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of her 
request for the transcripts. Ms. Razon asserts that the requested transcripts are 
relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying her request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Razon Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The 
Necessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Razon With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process 
And Equal Protection Because She Cannot Obtain A Merit Based 
Appellate Review Of Her Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CaNST. 
art. I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998». The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
that transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). 
Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appe"ate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants who have a statutory right to an appeal can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of "Iinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in a" other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." !d. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." !d. 
In Draper v. State, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." !d. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29,34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's) claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed) that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Ms. Razon fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Ms. Razon's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone which prevents her from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceeding were before the district court 
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the 
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see a/so State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
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to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made its 
sentencing determinations. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed 
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1-2. After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on 
probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and 
the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district 
court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point this 
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case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Ms. Razon is challenging the 
length of her sentence, which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing 
rationale. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review 
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2 
Further support for Ms. Razon's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery 
2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal." 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and 
Ms. Razon is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
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in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked 
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period 
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which 
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of 
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court 
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, 
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals 
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a transcript 
of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original sentence was not on 
appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. 
Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before 
the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original 
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the 
Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the 
nature of the original offense. Had Ms. Razon failed to request the transcripts at issue, 
the Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's 
decision to execute the original sentence. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
14 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Ms. Razon's request for the transcripts 
will render her appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing 
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the review of Ms. Razon's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, 
and therefore, Ms. Razon should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Razon With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Her Due Process Because 
She Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[t01 hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
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Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Ms. Razon has not obtained 
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
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Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . ., Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-S.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Ms. Razon on the 
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Ms. Razon is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Ms. Free her constitutional 
right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this 
appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the 
requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Ms. Razon's 
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Ms. Razon asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentences of six 
years, with two years fixed, and six years, with'three years fixed, are excessive. Due to 
the district court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence 
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sua sponte upon the revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the 
length of the sentence as being excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 
(Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of 
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 
(Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Razon does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Razon must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Ms. Razon's sentences are excessively harsh. Specifically, 
Ms. Razon's progress toward earning her GED is a mitigating factor. Ms. Razon was 
scheduled to complete her GED in January of 2012. (12/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.20-25.) 
Ms. Razon had also earned a scholarship which would cover the costs of two GED 
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tests. (Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, p.3l She needs to pass only one more 
test to obtain her GED. (Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, p.18.) 
Additionally, Ms. Razon's community and family based support are mitigating 
factors. Ms. Razon has strong support from her mother and her brother, both of whom 
wrote support letters prior to sentencing. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.8-9.15-1?) At the probation violation disposition hearing, 
Ms. Razon's trial counsel indicated the Ms. Razon "has a wonderful support group." 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16.) Ms. Razon had a bed available to her at the Jubilee 
House and attended treatment programs prior to the disposition hearing. (12/19/11 
Tr., p.12, Ls.13-25.) 
Additionally, Ms. Razon's difficult childhood and the negative impact it had on her 
mental health are mitigating factors. When Ms. Razon was ten years old she watched 
her father, who suffered from pancreatic cancer, while he was dying on her parent's 
bathroom floor. (Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, pp.13, 28.) Her father was 
revived, rushed to the hospital, but pronounced dead upon his arrival. (Part I Updated 
Sentencing Materials, p.28.) 
Ms. Razon suffers from depression and anxiety and was admitted into a mental 
health facility when she was either thirteen of fourteen years old. (PSI, p.12; (Part I 
Updated Sentencing Materials, pp.31-35.) Ms. Razon attributed this depression to the 
3 There were various sentencing materials considered by the district court at the 
December 19, 2011, probation violation disposition hearing, which were not included in 
the record on appeal. (12/19/11 Tr., p.5, L.12 - p.?, L.1.) Accordingly, a motion to 
augment has been filed concurrently herewith. Moreover, the exhibits were sent to 
appellate counsel's office as a facsimile in two parts and each part contains pagination 
in the upper right hand corner. For ease of citation, this brief will adhere to that 
pagination. Part I begins on page three and ends on page forty three. Part" begins on 
page one and ends on page thirty six. 
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death of her father. (PSI, pp.8-9, 12-13.) After her father died, Ms. Razon was raped 
when she was twelve years old. (PSI, pp.8, 15.) She ran away from home as a means 
to cope with those tragic experiences. (Part II Updated Sentencing Materials, p.15.) In 
2007 she was admitted to a care center for depression and suicidal ideation. (Part I 
Updated Sentencing Materials, p.16.) She also suffers from panic attacks. (Part II 
Updated Sentencing Materials, p.7.) 
Further, Ms. Razon's substance addiction is a mitigating factor. While Ms. Razon 
was diagnosed as dependent on nicotine and methamphetamine, she was only 
recommended for outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.67, 80.) In her 2011 substance 
addiction evaluation, she was also diagnosed as dependant on amphetamine, but 
received a recommendation for intensive outpatient treatment. (Part II Updated 
Sentencing Materials, p.36.) 
Finally, Ms. Razon's positive rider performance is a mitigating factor. While on 
her first rider, Ms. Razon completed all of her programming and also "completed 28 self-
study lessons, attended 41 church services, participated in yoga, attended 23 
Alcoholics/Narcotics/Cocaine Anonymous meetings, and volunteered 132 hours to the 
facility." (PSI, p.36.) Ms. Razon was considered a hard worker with a positive attitude. 
(PSI, p.37.) While on her second rider, Ms Razon also "attended 9 ANNA meetings[,] 
24 church services[,] and donated 12 hours of volunteer service to this facility." (PSI, 
p.52.) 
In sum, the mitigating factors present in this matter support the conclusion that 
the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the length of 
her sentences upon revoking probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Razon 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the fixed portion of her 
sentence, in docket number 39627, from three to two years. Alternatively, Ms. Razon 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of her sentences as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this ih day of September, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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